The monopoly of the silk trade and the management of its domestic markets during the reign of Shah Abbas I, and their impact on controlling the economic resources of the Safavid State

Abstract

This study examines the monopoly of the silk trade and the administration of its internal markets during the reign of Shah Abbas I (1587–1629) and their impact on controlling the economic resources of the Safavid state. It is presented as a continuation of a previous study that addressed the broader economic policies related to the silk trade in Safavid Iran, while this part focuses specifically on monopoly practices and the regulation of internal markets. The study is based on the hypothesis that the silk trade was not merely an economic activity, but rather a strategic instrument through which the Safavid state strengthened its centralized authority, controlled economic resources, financed its military and administrative reforms, and consolidated its political and economic position.

The study aims to analyze the policies adopted by Shah Abbas I in monopolizing the silk trade and organizing its internal markets, through examining mechanisms for regulating production and domestic consumption, developing commercial infrastructure, securing trade routes and caravan networks, as well as investigating monopoly policies in terms of their motives, implementation mechanisms, and outcomes. The research adopts the historical-analytical method, relying on Safavid sources, European travelers’ accounts, and modern multilingual studies, in order to provide a comprehensive reading of the economic, political, and administrative dimensions of these policies.

The findings reveal that Shah Abbas I pursued an economic strategy aimed at tightening state control over internal silk markets and reducing domestic consumption, while directing the majority of production toward foreign markets in order to maximize monetary revenues, particularly European silver required for financing the army and the central administration. The study also highlights the state’s efforts to develop commercial infrastructure through the establishment of caravanserais (khans), the improvement of trade routes, and the securing of caravan movement via the rah-dari system, which contributed to greater regularity of trade flows and reduced security risks associated with transportation.

Furthermore, the study demonstrates that the state monopoly over the silk trade and the management of its internal markets represented one of the clearest manifestations of economic centralization in the Safavid era. The state placed the purchase and marketing of silk under its direct supervision through a network of agents and officials, enabling it to control prices and export quantities, increase treasury revenues, and limit the influence of local power holders, particularly the Qizilbash. At the same time, silk was employed as a diplomatic instrument to strengthen commercial and political relations with European powers in the context of rivalry with the Ottoman Empire.

However, the study concludes that these policies were not without challenges, as they generated administrative corruption and manipulation of quantities and prices, in addition to dissatisfaction among some local producers due to reduced purchase prices and the constraints of monopoly practices. Despite these issues, Shah Abbas I’s policies significantly contributed to the consolidation of centralized authority, the control of economic resources, the expansion of internal and external trade, and the strengthening of the Safavid state’s economic and political power, making the monopoly and administration of the silk trade one of the key pillars of the Safavid political and economic project during his reign.